A method to verify originality of sequences secretly on distributed computing environment by Ken-Ichi Kurata et al.
A Method to Verify Originality of Sequences Secretly
on Distributed Computing Environment
Ken-ichi Kurata Hiroshi Nakamura
Research Center for Advanced Science
and Technology,







Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique,




In the field of molecular biology, it is important to find
gene sequences related to some phenomena, such as dis-
ease and chemical reaction. Once a target gene has been
sequenced, it must be confirmed whether the sequence is
already known or not in the world. If the sequence is not
yet revealed on databases, it is a novel and valuable se-
quence. In general, this comparison process is done by com-
paring exact sequence data with each other by using a ho-
mology search program. In this case, the exact sequences of
not only genomic databases but also newly sequenced genes
must be opened in public. Therefore, if we don’t like to open
the databases and/or the new sequences on public networks,
we must purchase them and search in local.
In this paper, we propose a new method to verify the orig-
inality of gene sequences secretly on public networks. At
fist, target raw sequences are manipulated to prevent them
from being reconstructed. Next, this method hashes all the
genomic sequences. Only the processed data are opened on
public networks. Finally, the hashed files are compared in
parallel to each other by the sorting method that we pro-
posed [4]. The hashed files are stored on genomic databases
in a distributed form.
Result: We describe how to implement this method upon
a grid computing environment and show the calculation
results on a world-wide grid environment between Japan,
Switzerland and France. This method successfully verified
the originality of the sequence SSB against E. coli K-12 and
B. subtilis.
Keywords: originality of sequence, grid computing, unique
sequence, the European Data Grid
1. Introduction
In the field of molecular biology, it is important to find
gene sequences related to a biological reaction. Once a gene
related to an interesting reaction has been sequenced, we
can look up the sequence in databases and confirm whether
it is already known or not. If the sequence does not yet ex-
ist on the target databases, it is a new and valuable sequence.
In general, this comparison process is done by compar-
ing entire sequence data with each other by using a ho-
mology search program. In this case, not only genomic
databases but also newly sequenced genes must be opened
on public networks. Therefore, if we don’t like to open the
databases and/or the new sequences on public networks, we
must buy the databases and search in local.
However, we would like to analyze such important se-
quences without private information. Hence, it is desirable
to store such information in a distributed database man-
aged by a responsible of clients, such as a hospital, and to
open only processed information without private informa-
tion. This environment allows us to analyze the information
without any risk of private information leaks.
Now, thanks to the development of the infrastructure of
high-speed networks, it is becoming feasible to deploy the
distributed computing environment on the Internet. One of
the projects that realize this type of computing environment
is called the European Data Grid project [7]. This project
provides the users with the distributed computing environ-
ment to deal with the problems hard to resolve by a normal
computer. Providing the infrastructure and tools that make
large-scale, secure resource sharing possible and straight-
forward is the Grid’s raison d’etre [6].
In this paper, we propose a method to confirm origi-
nality of sequences only by using processed genomic files
stored on distributed databases. This method compares pro-
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cessed data with one another without any raw sequence data
on public networks. Next, we describe an implementation
of the method on a world-wide grid environment between
Japan, Switzerland and France. We show an experiment to
confirm the originality of the SSB sequence of E. coli K-12
by comparing it to genomes stored on the databases.
In short, we would like to require the followings:
• The existence of a newly sequenced gene should be
verified secretly.
• This should be processed in parallel in a distributed
computing environment.
• As by-products, target specific primers and/or probes
for the gene should be designed.
2. Confirmation of originality
In this section, the signification of the verification is de-
scribed. After that, we propose a new method.
2.1. Signification of verification in grid computing
environment
When we find a valuable gene sequence, it must be con-
firmed whether the sequence is unknown or not. Namely, we
want to know whether the sequence is already reported or
not yet in the world. In general, genomic databases are enor-
mous. Therefore, this confirmation process must be pro-
cessed in parallel. Even if a cluster having thousands of
CPUs inside is used, all the data must be gathered and pro-
cessed on it. Hence, it is not practical to process the ge-
nomic data in a local cluster.
On the other hand, a grid computing environment con-
sists of lots of public resources distributed on the net-
works. The data can be assigned to a computing node near
their database. Therefore the network load can be well dis-
tributed. However, different from the cluster installed in a
private laboratory, the grid computing environment requires
opening the data on its public network. Most biologists
want to verify the originality of gene sequence data, such as
newly sequenced data regarding diseases, without opening
the exact sequence data. Hence, they purchase huge genome
databases and verify the originality using high-performance
clusters inside their laboratory.
Taking into consideration the above requirements, we
would like to propose the following calculation model.
• Only processed sequences are opened on public net-
works.
• The processing must be one way.
• The processed sequences are compared in parallel and
the originality is verified.
In order to keep in secret the exact sequence data, they
must not be opened on public networks. Instead of opening
the exact data publicly, only the processed data are opened.
Moreover, this process must be one way. That is, the exact
data must not be reconstructed only by using the processed
data. Finally, without the information of the exact data, the
comparing must be done in parallel. The originality of se-
quences must be verified by comparing only the processed
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Figure 1. Illustration on confirmation of orig-
inality of sequences. Each database has its
own genomic sequences. After processing
target genomic sequences, only the pro-
cessed data are opened in public and sent
onto the grid computing environment. Re-
trieval sequences are also processed. Their
processed data are sent onto the environ-
ment. Transferring the exact sequences into
processed files must be one way. In the grid
computing environment, the comparing be-
tween the processed data is done. If a file
does not correspond with any other file,
the exact sequence pertaining to the file is
unique against the target databases.
Figure 1 shows our proposed verification environ-
ment. Each database has its own genomic sequences,
ATC, ATAT and GCTGG. After processing target genomic
sequences, only the processed data are opened in pub-
lic and sent onto the grid computing environment. The
exact data must not be opened in public. Target gene se-
quences are looked up. These retrieval sequences are also
processed. Only their processed data are sent onto the envi-
ronment.
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2.2. Proposed method to verify originality
In this part, we propose a new method to verify the orig-
inality using public grid computing resources. At first, we
explain how to make the verification process in parallel.
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Figure 2. Illustration on our proposed method
to verify the originality of a gene sequence.
At first, the target gene sequence and all the
known gene sequences on the database are
hashed. Moreover, in order to insert artificial
mutation and splicing sites, the target gene
sequence is made redundant by AMS pro-
gram. Next, the hashed files are sorted on the
basis of their hash-key. In order to verify the
originality, it is sufficient to open the hashed
data of gene sequences in public. The sort-
ing is processed in parallel.
2.2.1. Verification process in parallel We propose a
method in Figure 2. In our method, at first, all the known ge-
nomic sequences are hashed by making Look Up Table
(LUT) and divided into small files. All the partial se-
quences, which begin from any position of the whole
genome to the 5’ -end, are hashed.
Each file has the partial sequences having the same hash-
key sequence. The above process can be done in local and
the hashed sequences are opened on public networks. More-
over, in order to insert artificial mutation and splicing sites,
the target gene sequence is made redundant by AMS pro-
gram. Next, the files having the same hash-key sequence
as each other are gathered onto a computer. Our proposed
sorting algorithm based on radix sort [4] processes the se-
quences on the computer. This algorithm finds unique se-
quences on the whole genome.
Once all the sequences have been hashed, this method
can be processed in parallel by the total number of hash-key
sequence. That is to say, if the length of hash-key sequence
is assigned to l, the method is parallelized by at most 4l. In
addition, this method uses hashed partial sequences with-
out any raw sequence in order to verify the novelty of gene
sequences. In our method, the information of hashed par-
tial sequences is enough to verify the originality. Hence, it
is not necessary to open the raw sequence data in public.
In short, the advantages of our proposed method are as fol-
lows:
• When the hash-key length is l, the method can be pro-
cessed in parallel by at most 4l.
• The information of hashed partial sequences is enough
to verify the originality of a target gene.
2.2.2. Insertion Artificial Mutation and Splicing sites
(AMS) It is not sufficient to hash a sequence, in order to
inhibit the reconstruction of it. Therefore, the possibility
of combination of reconstructed sequences is augmented
by inserting some artificial sequences. In this part, first,
the condition of unknown sequence is described. Second,
a method of prevention of the reconstruction is shown.
Condition of unknown sequence Here, we consider the
condition of unknown sequences. If one of the par-
tial sequences of a target gene is unique against all
known genes, it is an unknown sequence. In other words,
unknown sequence includes at least one unique se-
quence against all the known genes. For instance, let
us consider a known organism with a genome con-
sisting of gene "5’-ttaacaagtc-3’" and gene
"5’-agcttttca-3’". Suppose that a new gene se-
quence "5’-ttaagcaagca-3’" related to an in-
teresting experiment is found. An unknown gene se-
quence should include the partial sequences that never exist
on the known genome. According to the considered se-
quence, it consists of some partial sequences unique on
the known genome. For example, "5’-taag-3’" and
"5’-gcaa-3’", which are the components of the new se-
quence, do not exist on the known genome. Therefore this
new gene sequence is unknown. To the contrary, if a gene
sequence "5’-ttaacaagtc-3’" is found, all the par-
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tial sequences already exist on the genome, so that it is
known.
In our method, at first, a target gene sequence is hashed.
The hashed sequences are sent to distributed computing ele-
ments through public networks [4] . However, it risks recon-
structing the exact before-hashed sequence by hashed data.
Therefore, we have to propose a method to prohibit the re-
construction. Here, we propose a method. This method con-
sists of 2 operations. The first one is called artificial muta-
tion site insertion. The second one is called artificial splic-
ing site insertion.
Artificial mutation site insertion Suppose that there is a tar-
get gene sequence, g, g(j) ∈ {a, c, g, t}, j = 1 . . . l. The
length of this gene is l. The position j of this gene, g(j), is
a, c, g or t. Now the length of after-hashed sequence is as-
signed to θ. After hashed, the length of all the partial se-
quences is limited to θ. If the value of θ is large, the ex-
act before-hashed sequence is easily reconstructed. On the
other hand, if the value is small, it is difficult to verify the
originality of the sequence because short sequences happen
many times on the target gene sequence.
Therefore, we propose a method to mutate the sequence.
If the reconstruction of the sequence is tempted after pro-
cessed, the possibility of the reconstructed sequence is mul-
tiplied. Namely if n positions are mutated, the possibility is
multiplied by 2n. The detailed method is given as follows.
Now, we insert a mutation M into the position j of a tar-
get gene g. Namely, there are 2 possibilities on the recon-
structed sequence, g(1)g(2) . . . g(j−1)g(j)g(j+1) . . . g(l)
and g(1)g(2) . . . g(j−1)Mg(j+1) . . . g(l). Now, the value
of threshold, namely the length of after-hashed partial se-
quence is θ. When the whole gene sequence is hashed in our
formerly proposed method, the partial sequences including
the position j exist θ times. Hence, θ partial sequences must
be added into after-hashed sequences.
When n positions are mutated, the possibility is mul-
tiplied by 2n. The data size of after-hashed sequences in-
creases by 2n × θ.
For instance, a target sequence ttaacaagtc is considered.
The value of threshold is defined as 3. Now, the position 4
from the left hand is mutated by the mutation g. After the
target is hashed, there exist 3 sequences increasing this po-
sition, taa, aac and aca. Therefore, 3 sequences having the
mutation g, tag, agc and gca, are added into the hashed file.
If the target sequence is reconstructed by after-hashed data,
yet there are 2 possibilities, ttaacaagtc and ttagcaagtc.
Artificial splicing site insertion Suppose that there is a tar-
get gene sequence, g, g(j) ∈ {a, c, g, t}, j = 1 . . . l. The
length of this gene is l. The position j of this gene, g(j), is
a, c, g or t. Now the length of after-hashed sequence is as-
signed to θ. After hashed, the length of all the partial se-
quences is θ.
We propose a method to insert an artificial splicing site
into the sequence. If the sequence is reconstructed after pro-
cessed by this method, the possibility of the reconstruction
is multiplied. Namely if n splicing sites are inserted, the
possibility is multiplied by 2n. The detailed method is given
as follows.
Now, we insert an artificial splicing site be-
tween the position j and k of a target gene g.
Namely, there are 2 possibilities on the recon-
structed sequence, g(1)g(2) . . . g(j) . . . g(k) . . . g(l)
and g(1)g(2) . . . g(j)g(k) . . . g(l). The value of thresh-
old, namely the length of after-hashed partial sequence
is θ. When the whole gene sequence is hashed, the par-
tial sequences, whose length is θ, including the position
j and k exist θ − 1 times. Hence, θ − 1 partial se-
quences must be added into after-hashed data.
When n splicing sites are inserted, the possibility is mul-
tiplied by 2n. The data size of after-hashed sequences in-
creases by 2n × (θ − 1).
For instance, a target sequence ttaacaagtc is considered.
The value of threshold is defined as 3. Now, a splicing site
is inserted between the position 4 and 8, namely ttaa− gtc.
2 partial sequences including the before-spliced position 4
and 8, aa− g and a− gt, exist. These sequences are added.
If the target sequence is reconstructed by after-hashed data,
yet there are 2 possibilities, ttaacaagtc and ttaagtc.
Quantity of data Suppose that there is a target gene se-
quence, g. The length of this gene is l. Now the length of
after-hashed sequence is assigned to θ. After this gene se-
quence is hashed, the length of all the partial sequences is θ.
Since l >> θ−1 in general, the total data size of all the par-
tial sequences becomes θ(l − θ + 1) ∼ θ × l.
Even if the sequence is reconstructed after processed, the
possibility of the reconstruction is multiplied. When m mu-
tation sites are inserted, the possibility is multiplied by 2m.
The data size of after-hashed sequences increases by 2m×θ.
When s splicing sites are inserted, the possibility is mul-
tiplied by 2s. The data size of after-hashed sequences in-
creases by 2s × (θ − 1).
Now, the following equation is deduced.
C × θ × l = θ × 2m + (θ − 1) × 2s + θ × l (1)
C is the factor by which the total data size is multiplied.
Suppose that a gene sequence is random. As a character-
istic of the random sequence, the sequence whose length is
log4 l happens once on the random sequence. In general, the
genomic sequence has a more orderly form than the random
sequence. Therefore, when we assign log4 l as θ, the ge-
nomic sequence should have some unique sequences whose
length is less than θ. In this case, the above equation be-
comes as follows by substituting the value, l = 4θ, for the
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The total size of the hashed data is multiplied by this factor
C.
Example of verifying uniqueness of sequences having ar-
tificial mutation sites on distributed databases Sup-
pose that gene "5’-ttaacaagtc-3’" is stored on
a public database. Let us verify the originality of gene
"5’-agcttttca-3’". Now, this sequence is mutated at
2 points, "5’-agc{a,t}tt{g,t}ca-3’". Thus, gene
"5’-agcatttca-3’", gene "5’-agctttgca-3’"
and gene "5’-agcattgca-3’" are possible as well.
The threshold of partial sequence length is 4. The
size of hash-key is assigned to 1, namely, a,c,g,t
are hash-key sequences. The results of hashing and di-
viding function of gene "5’-ttaacaagtc-3’" is
shown in Figure 3. The results of mutated gene se-




















Figure 3. An example of hashing and divid-
ing function. There exists 4 files including the
hashed partial sequences based on the pub-
lic gene ”5’-ttaacaagtc-3’”. Each file includes
the partial sequences having the same hash-
key sequence.
Next, the files having hash-key a,c,g and t are gath-
ered from among the target databases onto CE1, CE2, CE3
and CE4, respectively. CE means Computing Element. Ev-
ery file is linked on each CE on the basis of its hash-key se-
quence, as shown in Figure 5.
Finally, all the sequences are individually sorted on each
CE with our proposed method [4]. This method is based on
radix sort and finds unique sequences from among target se-
quences by sorting them on the basis of the sequence left to

























Figure 4. An example of hashing and divid-
ing function. There exists 4 files including
the hashed partial sequences based on the
target gene ”5’-agc{a,t}tt{g,t}ca-3’”, which is
mutated at 2 points. Each file includes the
partial sequences having the same hash-key
sequence.
For example, sequence "ct" is found as a unique se-
quence on CE4. This sequence does not exist on the public
databases and is a partial sequence of the target gene. There-
fore, the target gene "5’-agcttttca-3’" is unique
against the sequence "5’-ttaacaagtc-3’".
3. Grid computing structure for verification
of sequences
The detailed structure of the European Data Grid (EDG)
is described in [4, 10]. In order to construct the grid com-
puting environment for verification of originality, as a node,
we use Computing Element (CE) having its own tempo-
rary database and Working Nodes (WN). On the machine
of CE, OpenPBS is working as a batch system. This batch
system distributes required jobs to available WNs. At first,
target genomic data are hashed on its private research cen-
ter. Next, only the hashed data are sent into the database
of a CE. The CE has the hashed data on its own database
and waits requirements of sorting jobs. Once the CE has re-
ceived the jobs, it schedules them and demands the process-
ing of them to its available WN. Every WN contacts freely
its local database.
Target genomic sequences are hashed and stored onto the
databases of each node beforehand. A gene sequence to be
verified is hashed in local and sent to the grid computing
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Figure 5. An example of linking function. Ev-
ery file having the same hash-key is gathered
from all the databases and linked based on
its hash-key on a CE.
environment. Only the hashed data are compared with each
other.
4. Material & method
In this section, we describe the program executing the
proposed method and its implementation on the EDG. At
first, we describe the computing environment used in this
work. Next, the data flow of the program is shown.
4.1. Calculation environment
The program that inserts artificial mutation and splic-
ing sites into target sequences (AMS) was written in C++.
The sequence analysis program for selecting the unique se-
quences was written in C++ and in part in Perl. This pro-
gram consists of 2 main modules. The first module works
in order to hash the entire genomic information and classify
it into some smaller sets of partial sequences. The second
module processes one of the sets derived from the entire ge-
nomic information by the first module. It sorts all the input
data and outputs the length of the unique sequences. In or-
der to implement this program onto the Data Grid environ-
ment, we made use of globus-job-run and globus-url-copy
supported by the Perl language. All the calculations were




























Figure 6. The sequences are individually
sorted on each CE. For example, sequence
”ct” is found as a unique sequence on CE4.
This sequence does not exist on the public
databases and is a partial sequence of the
target gene. Therefore, the target gene ”5’-
agcttttca-3’” is unique sequence.
First of all, all the genomic data had been hashed and
stored on each database of CEs. We issued all the com-
mands from a machine located in the European Organiza-
tion for Nuclear Research (CERN) in Switzerland. All the
jobs are assigned into the CE machine located in Research
Center for Advanced Science and Technology (RCAST) in
the University of Tokyo in Japan and that in the Ecole Cen-
trale Paris (ECP) in France. Each CE machine has its own
database.
The speed of local file transfer in RCAST and ECP was
about 70 Mbps and 250 Mbps, respectively. The speed of
file transfer between the machines of RCAST and the ma-
chines of ECP was about 1.6 Mbps. The best effective band-
width was measured by means of globus-url-copy command
using a file of about 157 MB. For real calculation, 1 CPU
(Pentium 4, 2GHz) is available in RCAST. 16 CPUs (Pen-
tium 4, 2GHz) are available in ECP. Each job was allotted
to one of the available CPUs by the CE of each site.
4.2. Data flow
The data flow of the verification is shown in Figure 8. At
first, E. coli genome was fetched from a genome database.
Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on High Performance Computing and Grid in Asia Pacific Region (HPCAsia’04) 

















Figure 7. Illustration on the Data Grid envi-
ronment used in this experiment. First of all,
all the genomic data had been hashed and
stored onto each database of CEs. We is-
sued all the commands from the machine lo-
cated in the European Organization for Nu-
clear Research (CERN) in Switzerland. All the
jobs are assigned into the CE machine lo-
cated in Research Center for Advanced Sci-
ence and Technology (RCAST) in the Univer-
sity of Tokyo in Japan and that in the Ecole
Centrale Paris (ECP) in France. Each CE ma-
chine has its own database.
The genome was hashed and stored onto the databases of
Tokyo and Paris.
The hashed genomic sequences were classified into some
smaller files on the basis of their hash-key. Once target ge-
nomic sequences were hashed and stored, only the hashed
files were used to verify the originality without touching any
exact sequence. The sequence of the Single-Side Band pro-
tein(SSB) to be verified was protected by AMS program and
hashed. This process was done in advance in a private area.
The hashed data were stored onto the databases located
in Tokyo and Paris. Only after-hashed data were opened and
stored on the databases. Next, the following was processed
in parallel in each node.
Each file of SSB was linked to the corresponding file of
E. coli on the basis of hash-key. The minimum length of all
the unique sequences of the gene was calculated. The link-
ing and sorting function was processed in parallel on these
public grid resources.
5. Result
In this section, the calculation result is given.
We tried to verify the originality of sequences against the
whole genome of E. coli K-12 (4.7 MB) by using the pro-












































Figure 8. Illustration on the data flow of the
verification. First, E. coli genome was fetched
from a genome database. The genome was
hashed and sent onto the databases of Tokyo
and Paris. The hashed genomic sequences
were classified into some smaller files on the
basis of their hash-key. The sequence SSB
that was to be verified was made redundant
by AMS program and hashed. This process
was done in advance and in private area.
Next, the hashed data were stored onto the
databases located in Tokyo and Paris. Only
after-hashed data were opened and stored
on the databases. Second, the following was
processed in parallel in each node. Each file
of SSB was linked to the corresponding file of
E. coli on the basis of hash-key. The minimum
length of all the unique sequences of the
gene was calculated. The linking and sorting
function was processed in parallel on these
public grid resources.
signed to 7. The limit of the maximum length of unique se-
quence was assigned to 30-mer.
After hashed, the files had only the partial sequences
whose length was not beyond this threshold. The total size
of the hashed file of E. coli K-12 genome was 157 MB. The
hashed file was divided into some smaller files on the ba-
sis of its hash-key. Now, the hash-key length was assigned
into 7 so that the file could be divided into up to 47 files. It
takes 98 seconds in constructing the hashed file of E. coli
K-12 genome on the machine having Pentium 4 2GHz. The
hashed file was stored onto the databases of RCAST and
ECP. This process was done only once before confirming
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Figure 9. Distribution of unique sequences.
X axis represents unique sequence length.
Y axis stands for the number of unique se-
quence. SSB with AMS means that the se-
quence SSB is processed with AMS and arti-
ficial mutation and splicing sites are inserted.
process.
In the same way, the SSB sequence coming from E. coli
K-12 was hashed and the result was stored onto the database
of RCAST. The size of SSB is 629 B. After hashed on the
same condition as the E. coli genome, the hashed file be-
came 163 KB as a result of having consumed 17 seconds.
5.1. Confirmation of originality
Figure 9 shows the distribution of unique sequences.
Since SSB originates with E. coli K-12, there are no unique
sequences on SSB against E. coli K-12 when the verification
is processed. When 4 artificial mutation sites and 2 artificial
splicing sites are inserted into the SSB sequence, there ex-
ist some unique sequences against the target genome. How-
ever, all of these unique sequences originate with artifi-
cially added parts of the sequence. Hence, it is confirmed
that there is no unique sequence on SSB against the target
genome by looking at the result.
On the other hand, compared to the B. subtilis, SSB has
some unique sequences against it. Even if 4 artificial muta-
tion sites and 2 artificial splicing sites are inserted into the
SSB sequence and compared, the distribution of the unique
sequence length is not so much changed. Moreover, it is
possible to verify whether the unique sequences originate
with the raw sequence or the artificially added sequences
by investigating the result.
In short, if a retrieval sequence has at least one unique
sequence against all the target databases and it is not from
parts including artificial mutation or splicing, it results in a
new sequence. If there is no unique part on its genuine se-
quence, it may be already a known sequence or a concate-
nated sequence.
5.2. Calculation time
In this part, the calculation time to compare SSB to E.
coli K-12 is described.
In this experiment, each file was divided into smaller
files on the basis of hash-key sequence. The number of
hash-key of each file was almost the same as each other. The
total task was split into some smaller tasks. Figure 10 shows
the calculation time to compare the hashed files of the target
genome to that of SSB. The line ECP 7: RCAST 3 means
that the assignment of task for ECP was 7, for RCAST 3.
For instance, when parallel number was 10, 7 tasks were
processed in ECP and 3 tasks in RCAST. The x-axis rep-
resents the number of files split by the hashing and divid-
ing function. Each file had the same number of hash-key
as each other. The y-axis represents the calculation time on
each site, namely, it is the total time to send all the hashed
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Figure 10. Total Calculation time versus the
number of tasks processed in parallel. The x-
axis represents the number of files split by
the hashing and dividing function. The y-axis
represents the total calculation time of the
tasks, namely, it is the time to send all the
hashed files, link the hashed files of E. coli to
that of SSB and sort them.
6. Discussion
In this paper, we described a new method to verify the
originality of gene sequences without leaking their exact se-
quence information. Moreover, we showed an implementa-
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tion of the method upon the grid computing environment
and its results.
In this work, we confirmed the effectiveness of the
method to verify the originality of the SSB sequence. This
sequence comes from E. coli K-12 genome and it was veri-
fied that this sequence did not exist on B. subtilis genome.
These genomic sequences are much smaller than that of hu-
man. However, once the whole genome is divided into
smaller pieces, these pieces can be processed in paral-
lel. Let us consider a genome whose size is N . Suppose
that the total size of the files become KN after hashed. If
the size of hash-key is assigned to n, the minimum size of
each file becomes KN4n . Therefore, even if the genome be-
comes much larger, it is feasible to process them in parallel
by making the hash-key size larger. For example, in this pa-
per, the total file size of the hashed genome E. coli K-12
was 157 MB. Since the size of hash-key sequence is as-
signed to 7, it is possible to divide the genomic files into at
most 47 = 16384 pieces of less than 10 KB each. It goes
without saying that these pieces can be processed in paral-
lel. In general, suffix tree is used to find unique sequences.
However, it consumes up a large amount of memory
space to construct the suffix tree. Therefore, when the se-
quences of an enormous size is analyzed, the suffix tree
requires larger memory space proportional to the total se-
quence size than a high-performance computer deals with.
Our method is able to avoid this difficulty due to the hash-
ing function and parallelism.
When we verify whether a target sequence is unknown
or not by a homology search program, the sequence is
compared to all the Open Reading Frames (ORFs) of the
genome. For example, E. coli K-12 genome has 4405 ORFs.
Therefore, at most 4405 comparisons between the target and
an ORF can be processed in parallel. To the contrary, in our
method, the maximum number of comparison processes in
parallel is limited by the size of hash-key. On the condi-
tion of this experiment, at most 16384 comparisons can be
launched in parallel.
This method requires a genome be hashed before sorting.
However, the hashing process for the genome can be done
beforehand and the hashed files can be stored on databases.
Moreover, the hashed partial sequences have sufficient in-
formation to verify whether a target sequence is unknown
or not. Namely, it is not necessary to process on public
networks the whole genomic sequences that may include
the private information, such as gene sequences specific
to some people or related to some diseases. In short, ex-
act private sequences do not need to be opened but the
hashed partial sequences so as to verify the originality of se-
quences. Furthermore, we propose a method to insert artifi-
cial mutation and splicing sites into the sequence. With this
method, we prevent sequences from being reconstructed.
This method works well but increases file size. The pos-
sibility of reconstruction might be abased without the aug-
mentation of after-hashed file size, if the way of hashing
is changed. As a future work, we would like to investigate
the condition of length of opened sequences, way of hash-
ing and redundancy of sequence.
On the other hand, when each partial sequence has the
information of its origin, its gene sequence can be recon-
structed. In this case, multiple alignments may be done for
all the ORFs, because the unique length of all the partial se-
quences is calculated in our method. Furthermore, it is pos-
sible to extend the method to make a mutual comparison
among all the ORFs by dynamic programming.
The sensitivity of the proposed method is subdued by
the threshold value, namely the length of hashed partial se-
quences. On one hand, if the value is too small, the original-
ity of sequences cannot be verified. On the other hand, if the
value is too large, for example all the partial sequences for
each hash-key have full-length sequence, the file becomes
too large after hashed and divided. Furthermore, the confi-
dentiality of sequences is broken. Namely, the genuine gene
sequence can be reconstructed by using the hashed data. In
this work, we assigned 30-mer to the length of threshold.
If a genomic sequence whose length is l consists of ran-
dom sequences, a sequence whose length is 30-mer happens
1
430 × l times on the genome. The size of E. coli genome
is Megabyte order, so that the above value is negligible.
Namely, we can say that such sequence should occur only
once on the genome. This point is observed in the calcula-
tion result.
In addition, in order to design the sequences for primers
and/or probes, it is indispensable to find unique sequences
on a target gene at the first step. If the target gene sequence
is judged as an unknown sequence by our proposed method,
it also means that unique primers or probes can be designed.
In regard with the parallelism of the grid computing,
when the number of the hashed files was spliced by 16, the
calculation time had the minimum. In general, the smaller
the file size is, the lower the effective bandwidth of net-
work may become. Besides that, the ECP site had just 16
CPUs and RCAST 1 CPU. When more than 17 tasks are
launched simultaneously, some jobs must wait. That is the
reason why the calculation time increases when the whole
process is divided into much smaller pieces. In this exper-
iment, in general, the distribution of 9 for ECP and 1 for
RCAST was the best one. The network speed between ECP
and RCAST was not so fast that the time to transfer the
hashed files from RCAST to ECP influenced the total calcu-
lation time very much. Therefore, when the number of par-
allel was assigned to 20, the distribution of 8 for ECP and 2
for RCAST was the least time-consuming one. This result
shows that the calculation on this condition might be influ-
enced by the network speed between the two sites. It was
better to distribute a small part of the tasks to RCAST than
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to calculate all the tasks only by using the resources of ECP.
The total calculation time depends on the distribution of
databases, the computation power of each site and the net-
work speed between sites. As a future work, we would like
to investigate the balance to optimize the total performance.
7. Conclusion
In this work, we described that the originality of se-
quences was able to be secretly verified without leaking any
exact sequence data on public networks. Our method suc-
cessfully compared only the processed data with each other
to verify the originality. This process was done in a dis-
tributed computing environment and implemented in a par-
allel form. As by-products, short unique sequences suitable
for DNA primers and probes were found.
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